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DoChanges in Hospital Outpatient
Payments Affect the Setting of Care?
Daifeng He and Jennifer M. Mellor
Objective. To examine whether decreases in Medicare outpatient payment rates
under the Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) caused outpatient care to
shift toward the inpatient setting.
Data Sources/Study Setting. Hospital inpatient and outpatient discharge files from
the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration from 1997 through 2008.
Study Design. This study focuses on inguinal hernia repair surgery, one of the most
commonly performed surgical procedures in the United States. We estimate multivari-
ate regressions of inguinal hernia surgery counts in the outpatient setting and in the
inpatient setting. The key explanatory variable is the time-varying Medicare payment
rate specific to the procedure and hospital. Control variables include time-varying hos-
pital and county characteristics and hospital and year-fixed effects.
Principal Findings. Outpatient hernia surgeries fell in response to OPPS-induced
rate cuts. The volume of inpatient hernia repair surgeries did not increase in response
to reductions in the outpatient reimbursement rate.
Conclusions. Potential substitution from the outpatient setting to the inpatient setting
does not pose a serious threat toMedicare’s efforts to contain hospital outpatient costs.
Key Words. Outpatient prospective payment system, Medicare payment reform,
substitution, setting of care
To contain outpatient health care spending, the Centers for Medicare & Med-
icaid Services (CMS) replaced the prior cost-based system for reimbursing
hospital outpatient services in August 2000 with the Outpatient Prospective
Payment System (OPPS). Under OPPS, CMS groups hospital outpatient ser-
vices into ambulatory payment classifications (APCs) based on clinical and
cost similarity and sets a common payment rate for all services in the same
APC (CMS 2010a). Hospitals are reimbursed at the predetermined rate for
services in a given APC instead of the actual costs incurred. Evidence suggests
that OPPS reduced the generosity of Medicare payments for outpatient care
overall (Becker unpublished data) and reduced Medicare payments for the
most common outpatient surgical procedures (He andMellor 2012).
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We examine whether the outpatient reimbursement cuts triggered by
OPPS led hospitals to shift Medicare services from the outpatient setting into
the inpatient setting. Although prior research has examined the effect of inpa-
tient reimbursement on the setting of care (e.g., Coulam and Gaumer 1991),
no prior study has examined whether OPPS-induced payment changes
altered the setting of care. As the first to examine OPPS’s effects outside the
outpatient department, we provide insight on OPPS’s potential to control
health care costs broadly defined.
Because OPPS caused reimbursement rates to rise or fall to varying
degrees depending on the procedure and the hospital’s historical payment,
analyzing its effects requires procedure-specific payment rates at the hospital-
level, pre- and post-OPPS.1 This study focuses on inguinal hernia repair sur-
geries performed in Florida hospitals from 1997 through 2008. One of the
most common surgeries in the United States, inguinal hernia repair is per-
formed in both inpatient and outpatient settings. Evidence shows that out-
comes and satisfaction are similar in both settings even among older patients
(Mitchell and Harrow 1994; Mattila et al. 2011). This suggests that providers
may have the discretion to treat patients in either setting. Furthermore, the
diagnosis of inguinal hernia is usually made by physical examination alone, so
hernia repair surgery is unlikely to be affected by OPPS-induced changes in
the payment of other procedures. This facilitates identification of the causal
effect of changes in hernia outpatient reimbursement rates.
We find that the average hospital experienced 4–10 percent cuts in
Medicare payment rates for inguinal hernia repair surgeries over the 5-year
period that OPPS was fully phased-in. Hospital fixed-effects regression
results suggest that OPPS-induced cuts in outpatient hernia repair reim-
bursements decreased the volume of some outpatient hernia repair surgeries;
however, we find no evidence that hospitals increased the number of inpa-
tient hernia surgeries in response to outpatient payment cuts. Because hospi-
tals’ ability to substitute hernia repair surgery across settings likely exceeds
that of other common outpatient procedures, we conclude that outpatient
cost containment efforts like OPPS are not seriously threatened by substitu-
tion to the inpatient setting.
Address correspondence to Jennifer M. Mellor, Ph.D., Department of Economics, College of
William and Mary, P.O. Box 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795; e-mail: jmmell@wm.edu.
Daifeng He, Ph.D, is also with the Department of Economics, College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, VA.
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BACKGROUND
Prior to OPPS, Medicare used several payment methods for hospital out-
patient services.2 Payments could be based on hospitals’ reasonable costs or
customary charges, the lesser of costs or charges, or a blended rate that com-
bined the lesser of costs or charges with a fee schedule. Partly because existing
methods provided little incentive for hospitals to lower costs, Congress estab-
lished theOPPS for hospital outpatient services. Effective August 2000, OPPS
is a fee schedule that groups similar hospital outpatient services into roughly
800 ambulatory payment classifications (APCs) and sets predetermined pay-
ments per service for all services in each APC (CMS 2010a).3 Thus, regardless
of the actual treatment cost, all services in an APC are reimbursed at the same
amount, with some adjustments for local labor costs, certain types of hospitals,
and outlier cases.
A large literature has examined prospective payment systems (PPS) in
inpatient, skilled nursing, rehabilitation, and psychiatric facilities,4 but only
two existing studies have examined the effects of OPPS. Becker (unpublished
data) found that OPPS lowered the generosity of reimbursement overall and
decreased costs of outpatient care. He and Mellor (2012) found that, on aver-
age, OPPS-induced rate cuts either decreased or had no effect on Medicare
volume, but increased private fee-for-service (FFS) volume.
Although decisions involving the provision and setting of patient care
are most often attributed to physicians, changes in hospital payments may lead
to the substitution of services across care sites. In the Ellis andMcGuire (1986)
model of physician behavior in response to prospective payment, the physi-
cian acts as the sole decision maker in patient care and as an agent to two prin-
cipals—the patient and the hospital. The model predicts that if the physician
places a greater value on hospital profits relative to patient benefits, a prospec-
tive payment system for hospital care can lead to the underprovision of hospi-
tal care. The literature on physician-hospital collaboration identifies various
mechanisms hospitals may use to influence physician behavior. As described
in Mark et al. (1998), collaboration can take the form of hospital strategies
such as sharing financial statements, prices, costs, and practice profiles with
physicians, or involving physicians in governance and budgeting. More
formally, hospitals and physicians may share an affiliation and thus share
administrative services or, in the most integrated systems, capital assets and
risk-based contracting. Prior studies show that physician-hospital integration
can influence health care delivery and outcomes. Madison (2004) found that
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hospitals using an integrated salary model (i.e., employing salaried physicians)
exhibited greater treatment intensity, and Cuellar and Gertler (2006) found
that fully integrated organizations had better patient quality measures.
These types of collaborative strategies and affiliations may increase the
relative weight that physicians place on hospital profits, and consequently,
changes in hospital payment rates may alter physician practice. We posit that
changes in hospital payment can work through the agency relationship to
influence physician decisions about the site of care, and we test whether reduc-
tions in outpatient reimbursement rates lead to the substitution of hospital care
from the outpatient to the inpatient setting.
Prior empirical studies suggest that hospital inpatient payment changes
caused hospital inpatient services to migrate to outpatient settings.5 Leader
and Moon (1989) showed that after inpatient PPS was introduced, surgery
rates among Medicare enrollees rose significantly in ambulatory settings.
Hadley and Swartz (1989) found that inpatient PPS significantly decreased
Medicare hospital days and increased all-payer hospital outpatient surgical
visits. Hadley, Zuckerman, and Feder (1989) found that some hospitals exhib-
ited large declines in inpatient discharge rates coinciding with large increases
in outpatient visits, which is “consistent with the view that these hospitals
[we]re substituting outpatient care for inpatient care” (p. 362).6 Our study
provides the first evidence on whether changes in hospital outpatient rates led
outpatient care to be substituted toward the inpatient setting.
METHODS AND DATA
Study Setting
We use hospital inpatient and outpatient discharge data from the Florida
Agency for Health Care Administration from 1997 to 2008, a period that
includes the introduction of OPPS in 2000 and its full phase-in by 2004.7 We
focus on short-term general hospitals; there are about 200 such hospitals in
our Florida sample.8
National datasets cannot be used to measure the hospital- and proce-
dure-specific payment and volume variables required for this analysis. Medi-
care outpatient claims from the pre-OPPS years have limited information on
specific procedures (ResDAC 2010). The National Hospital Discharge Survey
and the National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey are too small to
construct hospital-specific counts of volume. Several state discharge databases
have available data in multiple pre-OPPS years; we chose Florida asMedicare
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utilization in the state accounts for over 8 percent of all Medicare spending
nationwide (CMS 2007).
Selection of Study Procedures
We focus on surgical procedures used in the open repair of inguinal hernia, a
condition that occurs when soft tissue protrudes through the abdominal wall.
Inguinal hernia repair is one of the most commonly performed surgeries in
the United States. Nearly 770,000 such surgeries are performed annually at an
average cost of $2,000 to $2,500 per case (Rutkow 2003, p. 1045). At a total
cost approaching almost $2 billion, “it is naïve to think that health care policy
makers would not be interested” in expenditures on hernia repair (Rutkow
2003, p. 1045).
Inguinal hernia repair serves as a useful case study of the effects of pay-
ment rate changes on setting of care for additional reasons. First, hernia repair
surgery in the Medicare population is commonly performed in both inpatient
and outpatient settings in the same hospital. Among Medicare patients in
2003 nationally, 72.6 percent of all hernia repair surgeries performed in hospi-
tals occurred in the outpatient setting.9 In an average hospital in our Florida
sample, 78.5 percent of all hernia repairs were done as outpatient surgeries in
2007. Thus, important variation in the site of care exists.
Second, patient outcomes following inguinal hernia repair are similar
whether the surgery is performed on an inpatient or outpatient basis. Mitchell
and Harrow (1994) compared the outcomes of Medicare patients who under-
went open inguinal hernia repair surgery in both inpatient and outpatient
settings and found that rates of surgical complications and mortality were not
significantly different. In a randomized clinical trial, Mattila et al. (2011)
compared patients aged 65 years and older receiving inguinal hernia repairs
in inpatient and outpatient settings and found no significant differences in
patient outcomes or satisfaction between the groups. These findings suggest
that differences in setting of care are less likely to reflect preferences for higher
quality of care.
Third, measurement of hernia repair in this study is unlikely to be
affected by OPPS-induced changes in the payment rates for other procedures,
such as diagnostic and screening procedures. The diagnosis of hernia is highly
accurate with physical examination alone (van de Berg et al. 1999; Kraft et al.
2003); in patient guidelines for inguinal hernia diagnosis, the Society for
Surgery of the Alimentary Tract (SSAT) notes that “ultrasound or other radio-
logic studies are not required” (SSAT 2006). This makes hernia repair surgery
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less dependent on other procedures or their reimbursement rates. In contrast,
other surgical treatments (e.g., removal of cancerous lesions) may depend on
screening and diagnostic procedures (e.g., colonoscopy). Furthermore,
because there is limited progression of inguinal hernia, most delays in diagno-
sis and treatment would not eliminate hernia repair surgery in favor of another
surgical procedure; in contrast, delays in the diagnosis and treatment of other
conditions may rule out one approach (e.g., lumpectomy) in favor of another
(e.g., mastectomy). These features help us to identify the effect of payment
changes in hernia repair procedures separately from any effects of
OPPS-induced payment changes for various diagnostic and screening
procedures.
Measures of Inguinal Hernia Repair Surgeries by Setting
For each hospital and year in our sample, we construct separate counts of
inguinal hernia repair surgeries performed in the outpatient setting and in the
inpatient setting; both counts are done for discharges where the primary payer
was fee-for-service Medicare. We identify outpatient hernia repair surgeries
fromCPT codes and inpatient surgeries from ICD-9-CM procedure codes. To
select the relevant procedure codes, we used the Clinical Classification Soft-
ware (CCS) developed by the Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research
(AHRQ 2012a,b).
The CCS assigns multiple CPTand ICD-9 procedure codes to CCS 85
(inguinal and femoral hernia repair). Of the 19 CPTs codes in CCS 85, we
eliminated four procedures pertaining to femoral hernia and six procedures
used to treat children. As the clinical studies cited earlier showed comparable
patient outcomes following open inguinal hernia repair, we excluded four
CPTs used for laparoscopic hernia repair. Payment rate data for one open
inguinal hernia repair procedure (CPT 49521) are not available for a large
share of hospitals in our sample. Our analysis thus includes four procedures
used in the open repair of inguinal hernia (CPTs 49505, 49507, 49520, and
49525). For each procedure, we count the times the CPTwas recorded as the
principal procedure or as one of up to nine other procedures on outpatient dis-
charge records, by hospital and year. Of the ICD-9-CM procedures in CCS
85, we excluded codes for femoral hernia repair and laparoscopic repair of
inguinal hernia, and included 14 procedures used in the open repair of ingui-
nal hernia (5300–5305 and 5310–5317).10 We count the times any of these 14
procedures appear as the principal procedure or as one of up to nine other
procedures on inpatient discharge records, by hospital and year.
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Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for open inguinal hernia repair sur-
geries by setting in our sample hospitals in 1999. Sample sizes vary by proce-
dure (based on the availability of payment rate data) and by setting (based on
the availability of discharge records).11 Panel A reports the mean number of
times the procedure was performed in the outpatient setting as the principal
procedure and as either the principal or other procedure. CPT 49505 is the
most commonly used of the four outpatient procedures; the average hospital
performed 24.6 surgeries involving that procedure in that year. Panel B
reports the mean count of hernia procedures in the inpatient setting. There
were 8.2 inpatient open inguinal hernia repair surgeries performed as the prin-
cipal or other procedure per hospital in 1999.
Payment Rate Measures
We next construct hospital-specific Medicare payment rates to outpatient
departments for each of the open inguinal hernia repair procedures described
above (CPTs 49505, 49507, 49520, and 49525). For the post-OPPS years, we
obtain quarterly CMS publications reporting payments by ambulatory pay-
ment classification (APC) along with quarterly crosswalks from CPT to
APC.12 We create hospital-specific measures by adjusting APC payment rates
using the hospital wage index and we create annual measures by averaging
the quarterly data.
To obtain hospital- and procedure-specific payments in the pre-OPPS
years, we follow the algorithm developed in He and Mellor (2012) to impute
hospital- and procedure-specific charges from the total charge field on the dis-
charge record. The algorithm identifies CPT-specific charges for 58–94 per-
cent of the hospitals in our sample depending on the CPT.13 Once we obtain
procedure- and hospital-specific charges, we apply hospital-specific outpatient
surgery payment-to-charge ratios imputed from 1997 to 1999 annual Medi-
care cost reports.
Figure 1 illustrates median Medicare payment rates (in 2008 dollars)
over time for each of the four procedures. Median payment rates decreased by
4–10 percent between 1999 and 2004 (before and after the full phase-in of
OPPS), and the majority of hospitals (51–60 percent, depending on the proce-
dure) experienced a decrease in payment rate in this time period. About
40–45 percent of the procedure-specific within-hospital variation in payment
rates over the 12 years in our sample occurs in the years around the imple-
mentation of OPPS, and a large portion (between 80–88 percent) of the 1999–
2004 payment variation represents decreases in payments from the prior year.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (Based on 1999 Data)
Variable Name Mean SD N
Panel A: Counts of outpatient procedures
Principal procedures 49505 23.13 28.62 181
49507 1.74 2.60 133
49520 3.82 4.76 171
49525 1.94 4.79 111
Principal and other procedures 49505 24.55 29.87 181
49507 1.95 2.90 133
49520 4.03 4.95 171
49525 2.03 4.80 111
Panel B: Counts of inpatient procedures
Principal procedures 49505 5.96 5.68 177
49507 6.07 5.73 149
49520 5.94 5.72 173
49525 6.23 5.64 133
Principal and other procedures 49505 8.21 7.49 177
49507 8.40 7.53 149
49520 8.14 7.47 173
49525 8.61 7.39 133
Panel C: Hospital-level controls
Not-for-profit ownership (nfprofit) 0.45 0.50 183
Public ownership (govt) 0.11 0.31 183
Teaching (teaching) 0.03 0.18 183
Acute care beds (acutebeds) 236 166 183
Proportion of female hernia patients
(p_prop_female)
0.17 0.08 173
Proportion of black hernia patients
(p_prop_black)
0.06 0.11 173
Proportion of Hispanic hernia patients
(p_prop_hisp)
0.08 0.21 173
Proportion of hernia patients aged 75–85
(p_prop_7585)
0.42 0.13 173
Proportion of hernia patients over age 85
(p_prop_85up)
0.12 0.08 173
Proportion of hernia patients w/CPD
(p_prop_cpd)
0.09 0.10 173
Proportion of hernia patients w/diabetes
(p_prop_diabetes)
0.06 0.06 173
Proportion of hernia patients w/renal
disease (p_prop_renal)
0.002 0.007 173
Proportion of hernia patients w/principal
diagnosis of hernia (p_prop_samediag)
0.71 0.17 173
Panel D: County-level controls
Total population (in thousands) (totpop) 340.2 441.2 45
Proportion black (c_prop_black) 0.12 0.07 45
continued
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These data suggest that OPPS resulted in meaningful declines in payment
rates for these procedures across hospitals.
Empirical Approach
To examine how OPPS-induced payment changes affected the setting of care,
we estimate separate regressionmodels of outpatient and inpatient open ingui-
nal hernia repair surgery counts. In each regression, the dependent variable is
the log of surgery counts of either a specific outpatient procedure or the inpa-
tient hernia procedures in a given hospital and year, for years from 1997 to
2008.14 The key explanatory variable is the Medicare hospital outpatient
department reimbursement rate for a given procedure in a given hospital and
year. The estimated coefficient on the payment variable can be interpreted as
a price elasticity of volume given the log–log specification. If hospitals engage
in substitution across site of care in response to cuts in outpatient payment
rates, the price elasticity will be positive in the outpatient volume regressions
and negative in the inpatient volume regressions.
Because OPPS also affected Medicare beneficiaries’ cost sharing, we
control for coinsurance amounts in 2008 dollars for each procedure in each
hospital and year. For the post-OPPS years, we calculate coinsurance amounts
Table 1. Continued
Variable Name Mean SD N
ProportionHispanic (c_prop_hisp) 0.08 0.09 45
Proportion female (c_prop_female) 0.51 0.02 45
Proportion age 65 and up (c_prop_age65) 0.19 0.08 45
Median household income (in thousands
of $) (c_medhhinc)
35.8 5.6 45
Unemployment rate (c_unemprate) 12.2 3.1 45
Number of procedures performed in
ASCs (c_ASC_count)
117 150 45
Note. Parentheses indicate the abbreviated variable name used in tables of regression results. The
number of Florida counties in our dataset is smaller than the total number of counties (67) in the
state because (a) some counties do not have hospitals; (b) some small hospitals are not required to
report data to the Florida AHCA, and (c) some hospitals have missing data on other variables.
Missing data on the sole hospital in a county means that county is no longer included in the sam-
ple. In the regressions, counts of procedures performed in ASCs are defined separately for each of
the procedures in this study; above we report the mean and standard deviation of the average
count across all procedures. Data on hospital beds, teaching status, and ownership are from annual
issues of the Hospital Beds and Services List published by the Florida AHCA. Population data are
from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Florida Legislature’s Office of Economic and Demographic
Research. County income and unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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from CMS quarterly releases of the OPPS PPS pricer documentation.15 For
the pre-OPPS years, when coinsurance was set at 20 percent of charges (Med-
PAC 1999), we apply this percentage to our imputed hospital- and procedure-
specific charges.
We also include the hospital-year-level and county-year-level controls
shown in Table 1. We control for the hospital’s ownership status, teaching
status, and bed size, and we control for the demographic and clinical charac-
teristics of patients constructed from the combined sample of inpatient and
outpatient Medicare FFS discharges for open inguinal hernia repair. We mea-
sure the proportions of hernia repair surgeries performed on female (vs. male)
patients, patients aged 75–84 years, or 85 years and up (vs. under 75), and
black or Hispanic (vs. white) patients. We also control for the proportion of
discharges with a primary diagnosis of inguinal hernia16 and the prevalence of
various comorbidities.17
County-year-level controls include estimates of the total population, the
proportions of the population age 65 and up, female, Hispanic and black, the
median household income in 2008 dollars, and the unemployment rate. To
Figure 1: Median Payment Rates
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control for market-level changes affecting hospitals, we include the number of
times a given CPT procedure for hernia repair was performed in ASCs
located in the same county as the hospital. Because ASC volume may be
endogenous to Medicare payment, we test whether our results are sensitive to
the inclusion of this measure, and they are not.18
We include year- and hospital- fixed effects and a full set of three-digit
zipcode-year dummies. Year-fixed effects help to control for Medicare hospi-
tal inpatient payments and physician reimbursements for hernia, as most vari-
ation in these payments comes from annual updates to nationwide payment
schedules. The three-digit zipcode-year dummies control for any factors that
vary over time at that level of geography and may influence hospital surgical
volumes. For example, the zipcode-year dummies help to control for remain-
ing sources of variation in Medicare reimbursements for inpatient hernia sur-
gery to inpatient hospitals and physicians, such as changes in the local hospital
wage index used to adjust inpatient and physician reimbursements.19 These
dummies also control for the outpatient private pay price (often measured at
the three-digit zipcode level in prior studies (Yip 1998; He and Mellor 2012)
and the volume of and reimbursement rates for ambulatory surgeries
performed in physician offices to the extent those vary at the three-digit
zipcode level.20 Nonetheless, there may be some residual variation over time
and within individual hospitals that we are unable to capture with these
zipcode-year dummies.
RESULTS
The main regression results are reported in Tables 2 and 3 for outpatient and
inpatient volumes, respectively. In columns (1) through (4), the dependent
variables are based on counts of principal procedures alone; in columns (5)
through (8), the dependent variables are based on counts of principal and
other procedure codes combined. For each price elasticity of volume estimate
we report three standard errors: the unclustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses followed by robust standard errors clustered by county and by hospital
(the first and second sets of brackets, respectively).
In the outpatient hernia models (Table 2), the elasticity estimates are
positive and several are statistically significant, suggesting that outpatient
hernia surgeries fell in response to OPPS-induced rate cuts. In the inpatient
hernia models (Table 3), the elasticity estimates are very small, ranging
from 0.05 to 0.15 in the principal procedure count models, and none of the
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estimates is statistically significant. Thus, we see no evidence that outpatient
payment cuts shifted surgical volume toward the inpatient setting. We also
estimate the models in Tables 2 and 3 in which we weight the observations
based on either the hospital’s number of acute care beds or the hospital’s
combined number of inpatient and outpatient hernia discharges in 1999. All
three approaches yield very similar results.
We consider several reasons for the small and insignificant effects on
inpatient volume observed in Table 3. First, it is possible that hospitals experi-
encing the largest rate cuts under OPPS were also experiencing a trend of
declining inpatient volume for some unknown exogenous reason.21 This kind
of preexisting trend could work against the policy response, leading to muted
results in the inpatient volume regressions in Table 3. To test whether such a
trend exists in the pre-OPPS period, we conduct a falsification test by creating
a “fake payment” by assigning the payment from 2004 (the year OPPS went
into full effect) to 1999. We then estimate our regressions using data from the
three pre-OPPS years. If there was a preexisting trend of declining inpatient
volume in hospitals with significant payment decreases under OPPS, our fake
payment coefficient would be negative and significant. However, the results
reported in Table 4 rule this out. In no case is the fake payment coefficient
statistically significant.22
It is possible that requiring all hospitals to have the same response
obscures heterogeneous effects by hospital type. Many studies show that regu-
lations affecting Medicare, including inpatient PPS, have more pronounced
effects on hospitals with larger shares of Medicare patients (e.g., Salkever
2000). To test whether “highly exposed” hospitals experience payment-
induced changes in inpatient volume, we interact the log payment variable
with the hospital’s share of outpatient and inpatient discharges in whichMedi-
care FFS was the primary payer, measured in the last year prior to OPPS
(1999).23 The results from this exercise suggest that outpatient payment cuts
had no effect on inpatient volume even among the highly exposed hospitals.
None of the interaction term coefficients or the payment elasticities is statisti-
cally significant. We also estimated our regressions on a sample of hospitals
with at least 1 year of no missing payment data between 1997 and 1999. This
restriction omits hospitals with payment data in only the years after the policy
change, so it may have the advantage of linking the within-hospital payment
variation more closely to OPPS. Nonetheless, we observe the same pattern of
results as in the larger sample: reductions in outpatient payments reduce
outpatient surgical volume but have no effect on inpatient surgical volume
even if we allow effects to vary by Medicare share. Finally, we considered the
1608 HSR: Health Services Research 48:5 (October 2013)
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possibility that hospital surgical volume was affected both by the hospital’s
own payment rates under OPPS and by changes in competitors’ prices. We
constructed two controls for competitors’ prices: the average payment to other
hospitals in the Hospital Referral Region where the hospital is located, and the
average payment to other hospitals in the county where the hospital is located.
The addition of each control slightly increased some own-price elasticities in
the outpatient volume models; results from the inpatient volume models were
nearly identical.24
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Changes to hospital outpatient reimbursement are one means of controlling
growth in outpatient spending; one threat to the effectiveness of this
approach is that hospitals could alter the site of care when rates in the out-
patient setting drop. It is generally believed that the introduction of Medi-
care inpatient PPS led to substitution from the inpatient setting and toward
the outpatient setting. Because inpatient care is more resource-intensive
than outpatient care, substitution toward the inpatient setting could under-
mine the cost containment goals of the policy. We study whether OPPS-
induced changes in outpatient payments increased inpatient volume for
inguinal hernia repair surgery. Our results offer no evidence that such rate
cuts led hospitals to increase the number of inpatient surgeries, and they
suggest that the substitution of inpatient care for outpatient care does not
pose a serious threat to efforts to contain costs through OPPS, at least in
the case studied here. This finding has important policy implications in
light of rapid growth in Medicare outpatient spending (MedPAC 2009,
2010), continuing reductions in real Medicare payments to hospital outpa-
tient departments under the Affordable Care Act (CMS 2010b), and
renewed interest in all-payer rate programs that extend government-deter-
mined reimbursement rates to private insurers (e.g., NCSL 2010; Murray
2012; Pauly and Town 2012).
This study is limited by its focus on open inguinal hernia repair surger-
ies; however, this focus has its advantages. The debate about the appropriate
setting of care for hernia repair is still ongoing, as evidenced by recent
research on differences in outcomes across care settings after hernia repair
(e.g., Mattila et al. 2011). In contrast, there are well-established guidelines for
the setting of care for other common outpatient procedures. For example,
99.6 percent of all lens and cataract procedures performed in U.S. hospitals
1610 HSR: Health Services Research 48:5 (October 2013)
occur on an outpatient basis (AHRQ 2007) and routine endoscopic proce-
dures have long been performed in physician offices and ASCs (Pike 2002).
We expect that the potential to substitute hernia surgeries from the outpatient
to inpatient setting exceeds the potential to substitute common outpatient pro-
cedures such as colonoscopy, endoscopy, and cataract removal, and this
broadens the generalizability of our results.
Finally, our results suggest that OPPS reduced the outpatient volume of
some types of hernia procedures without increasing inpatient volume. This
pattern could suggest that more hernia repairs are taking place in other ambu-
latory settings, or that there was overutilization of outpatient surgery in the
pre-OPPS period or delays or reductions in necessary care in the post-OPPS
period. Without additional data on patient outcomes and treatment in other
ambulatory settings, we are unable to investigate these alternate explanations;
future research on these possibilities would be worthwhile.
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NOTES
1. The OPPS-induced payment change depends on the APC group to which the pro-
cedure was assigned, the local wage index, and costs in the pre-OPPS years for a
given hospital.
2. OPPS pertains to the reimbursement of hospitals; separate fee schedules are used
to reimburse physicians’ professional services and other types of outpatient facili-
ties such as ambulatory surgery centers.
3. See Wynn (2005) and He and Mellor (2012) for additional information on the fea-
tures of OPPS.
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4. See, for example, Cutler (1995), Norton et al. (2002), White (2003), McCall et al.
(2003), Sood, Buntin, and Escarce (2008), and Grabowski, Afendulis, and McGuire
(2011), as well as reviews by Salkever (2000) andChalkley andMalcomson (2000).
5. Evidence suggests that physician payment changes can also alter the site of care.
See, for example, Long, Settle, and Stuart (1986), Cohen (1993), Baker and Roy-
alty (2000), and Decker (2009).
6. For other evidence of the association between PPS and outpatient utilization, see
Fisher (1987, 1988), Mitchell, Wedig, and Cromwell (1989), andMenke (1990).
7. Children’s hospitals and cancer hospitals met permanent “hold harmless” provi-
sions, and critical access hospitals are exempt from OPPS altogether. We exclude
those hospitals from our sample.
8. The exact number varies slightly over time depending on entry/exit and the fact
that facilities with fewer than 200 visits in a quarter are exempt from reporting.
9. Figures are based on the authors’ calculations using the combined number of ingui-
nal and femoral hernia repairs from AHRQ (Agency for Healthcare Quality and
Research) (2007), tables 5 and 9 and figure 15. Counts of inguinal hernia repairs by
site of care are not available, but almost all groin hernias (96 percent) are inguinal
(Bax, Sheppard, and Crass 1999).
10. The AHRQ CCS tool does not include a crosswalk from each specific CPT to a
particular subset of these 14 ICD-9-CM procedures. Similarly, other cross coders
(e.g., Ingenix 2010) link the full set of ICD-9-CM procedures to each individual
hernia CPT in our group.
11. Some hospitals have either inpatient discharges or outpatient discharges, but not
both. This may be because some hospitals do not have outpatient departments; this
would explain why sample sizes are generally smaller in Panel A compared with
those in Panel B.
12. These are available at www.cms.gov/PCPricer/OutPPS and www.irp.com/apc/
apc_ref.html.
13. The match rate is particularly low for CPT 49521, which is excluded from our
analysis.
14. Because OPPS was implemented on August 1, 2000, we exclude 2000 from our
regression analysis. We also exclude 2001–2003, the transitional corridor period,
when hospitals were not fully subject to OPPS.
15. See www.cms.gov/PCPricer/OutPPS, accessedOctober 20, 2010.
16. These include ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes 550.00, 550.01, 550.02, 550.03, 550.10,
550.11, 550.12, 550.13, 550.90, 550.91, 550.92, 550.93, v64.41.
17. We use diagnosis codes on discharge records and in Deyo, Cherkin, and Ciol
(1992) to identify the following comorbid conditions: malignant neoplasms, diabe-
tes, hypertensive heart conditions, ischemic heart disease, congestive heart failure,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and renal disease. These conditions are
similar to those used in Mitchell and Harrow (1994). A few of these comorbid
conditions were not identified in any of the hernia repair discharges in our sample.
18. Estimated payment elasticities are nearly identical in size and significance whether
the ASC procedure count is controlled for or not, which suggests ASC procedure
volume andHOPD payment rates are not correlated.
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19. Other sources of variation in DRG price are the hospital’s DSH payments and
teaching status. Dafny (2005) claims that most price variation comes from the
DRGweight.
20. We lack data on physician office visit volume and reimbursement rates for physi-
cians’ professional services. The finest level of geography for which the physician
reimbursement data from Truveen Health Analytics (formerly MarketScan) are
available is the three-digit zipcode; our three-digit zipcode-year dummies control
for any factors, including physician reimbursement rates and office visit volume,
that vary at the three-digit zipcode level.
21. Payment rate changes were exogenously introduced throughOPPS; however, poten-
tial endogeneity of the payment variable remains something of a concern because the
size of the payment rate change depended on hospitals’ pre-OPPS cost-based reim-
bursement levels, leaving hospitals with the highest cost-based pre-OPPS payments
to face the largest payment reduction whenOPPSwas in full effect.
22. We cannot rule out the possibility of contemporaneous trends during the OPPS
period.
23. MeanMedicare share is 23 percent in 1999.
24. These results are available upon request.
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